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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
RAY~10ND

R. CANNON,
Plaintiff and Appellant

Civil No. 8083

vs.
JACK L. NEUBERGER and
EVELYN L. NEUBERGER,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S REPLY
BRIEF
t

STATEMENT
Plaintiff deems this reply necessary in order to point
out to this court some flagrant misstatements of fact and
quotes of incomplete and disconnected bits of evidence,
contained throughout respondents' brief in order that the
real facts may not be lost sight of, and to answer such
new matter as appears therein.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT No. 1: That the defendants in their brief
gave no sufficient reasons based either upon the undisputed facts or upon the law applicable thereto in
answer to· the points presented in Appellant's brief;
and that inasmuch as Respondents presented their
entire ARGUMENT under their single point, Appellant will answer the same in like manner.
Defendants' for example admit as they must do because there is no direct conflict in the evidence everything stated in plaintiff's Statement of Facts concerning
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the three huge Poplars, the· two Siberian Elms, and the
disastrous consequences resulting therefrom, but say "they
desire to point up some additional and what we feel to be
highly pertinent facts." These "highly pertinent facts" so
given are:
That plaintiff stated Siberian Elms are a nuisance,
that his neighbor Mary Beutler testified he obtained these
trees from her and planted them himself, that plaintiff had
a "large>> Siberian Elm close to his house, and that when
asked why he did not cut it down, he first d~nied and
then admitted he got the elms from the Beutlers. What
does the record s~ow? Plaintiff, to mention only two
places, (Tr. 45, 55) did so testify the two elms are a
"nuisance" and it seems to t4e writer he gave good reasons
for making the statement. But at no place did he say he
planted the two Siberian Elms on defendants' property; in
fact he stated he did not. (Tr. 47). Nor did Mrs. Beutler
say he planted Siberian Elms on defendants' lot. She
simply said that plaintiff obtained some trees from them
when he bought his premises and that he planted them on
his lot. (Tr. 83). He planted two of these trees on his
parking lot, both of which were removed years ago, and
one on his back lot which he intended to remove as he
had hardwood trees to replace (and which has been
removed). (Tr. 46). Nor did he, as defendants state bring
the Siberian Elms on defendants> lot. But he did say seeds
could have been blown northward from across the street
( Beutlers) or from Fred Neuberger's place, immediately
east of defendants' premises. But the defendants themselves planted two Siberian Elms on their own lot. ( Tr.
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87). Nor is it stated anywhere in the record that the
Siberian Elm on plaintiff's lot is a large one. It was planted
under the overhanging branches of the Poplars on defendants' lot and was not to exceed six inches in diameter. At
no place did plaintiff deny he planted a tree on his lot nor
on the parking in front of his premises.
Counsel next stated on page 2 of brief that plaintiff
did not claim any damage to his property which is termed
by the court, "sensible damages," ~nd then quotes where
the \Vriter of this brief waived damages; and then picks
up another fragmentary bit of evidence to the effect that
plaintiff claims he is entitled to have these trees removed
because they shade his property. Because the record is
so complete with so many other reasons for wanting the
alleged nuisance abated, no further comment shall be
made on this "shade" statement. Our Statute, Sec. 78-38-1,
U. C. A., 1953, was quoted and commented on at page 8
of Appellant's brief and the court's attention is directed
thereto. It will be observed from a reading of the statute
that it ends by 'providing: "and by the judgment the
nuisance may be enjoined or abated, and damages may
also be recovered." The damages referred to is no doubt
monetary damages: It was only these that were waived.
Futhermore, to "waive" does not imply that there were no
damages; in fact the reverse is true. Under our statute,
certainly no prejudice could result because plaintiff did
not care to follow through for these damages. It will also
be .observed from reading the cases cited herein, that in
most instances relief was awarded without monetary damages. Most plaintiff simply want the nuisance removed
so they can enjoy their property. In Coon vs. Utah Con-
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struction Co., (Utah) 228 P. 2d, 997, cited by defendants
at page 7 of their brief, for example, the plaintiff failed to
prove monetary damages and so this court failed to award
any. But this court did not for that reason fail to grant
the "nuisance" relief asked for. The plaintiff failed to
prove the "nuisance" feature also. The facts in this case
are entirely different from the facts in the case at bar,
but it does indicate that because "monetary" damages are
either not asked for nor awarded that this is no reason
plaintiff is not entitled to the other relief provided for by
the statute.
Counsel for defendants states at page 2 of brief, and
repeats at page 8, that after a view of the premises by the
court, plaintiff then waived damages. This is not the fact.
The record shows (Tr. 82) the court recessed at 12:05 and
reconvened at 2.00 p. m. On the next page (Tr. 83),
counsel for plaintiff waived damages. Defendants then
put in their proof and at page 106 (Tr.) Mr. Preston says:
"Do you want to go out in the rain and look around." Then
at the bottom of next page (Tr. 107) the court says: "Be
in recess until next Monday at 10 o'clock, and we can go
up now and view the premises in question." Recessed at
3:15p.m. The intended innuendo is wholly unwarranted
because it is unsupported by the record, and because
furthermore there is no evidence on the part of the defendflnts refuting plaintiff's testimony as to size and condition of trees, overhanging branches, damages done by
root ·system, leaves, falling branches, etc. In fact, the
plaintiff even volunteered to the court to spade any part
of the premises desired by him. ( Tr. .50) .
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At Tr. 37 plaintiff testified to the enormous quantities
of leaves which fall upon his premises, due in part because
the winds customarily blow westward out of Logan Canyon. At page 7 of brief ·consel states that it is a fair assumption that plaintiff is an eccentric person because he
complains that the winds carry leaves upon his premises
and that the law of nuisances is not designed to assist such
people in nuturing their own peculiarities. At page 10 of
brief, closing sentence, counsel says: "However, we conclude that it is fortunate for our people that we will seldom
find one so allergic to trees as is this plaintiff." And at
page 7 of brief counsel says: "But, the Court further held
that much of plaintiff's woes were idiocyncrisies, and that
a normal and reasonable person would not have been
affected." I think it would have been more helpful as well
as fair had counsel discussed facts. However, I do not
feel that such statements and criticism should go unchallenged and so I shall answer the last first.
The record shows (Tr. 49) that in college plaintiff
majored in Education, Vocational Agriculture, and that
he is now vocational agriculture instructor at South Cache
High School. ( Tr. 27) . In fact he has held this position
for some years. His wife, and F. A. Pehrson, expert testified to much the same line of testimony as did plaintiff,
and so did his neighbor, Don Allen, but to a lesser extent.
I have re-examined the Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and
Judgment and Decree of the lower court, as well as the
decision of the court shown at Tr. 108-109, and nowhere
do I firid any such statement made by the court. It is
inconceivable that the lower court would make such state-
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ment. Just why counsel for the defendants should regard
the making of any such unfounded statement as either
advisable, necessary or appropriate is not understandable
to either the plaintiff or the writer of this brief.
Next criticism. If the winds customarily blow out of
Logan Canyon westward, and the trees themselves, as a
result lean toward the west, and your home and other
buildings and children and perhaps others are either in
the path of these trees or underneath them in case they
should be blown down, is this not an additional reason
why the hazard is not increased by the wind, and cause
for concern? F. A. Pehrson, expert, testified that he,
"Wouldn't sleep myself if they were arotrnd my house at
all." Is not such a wind an element? Because a person
sees and recognizes such an element, and danger, is he
eccentric? Is he nuturing a peculiarity? Especially, so,
when there is not even evidence to the contrary produced
by defendants. Is a person under these corcumstances
to be called ellergic to trees? If so then the decisions of
courts abound with relief being given to persons in the
same plight as this plaintiff who seeks relief under statutes
identical or similar to ours. It is submitted there is no
merit to the criticism levelled at plaintiff. We believe the
law of nuisances under our statute is designed to cover just
such conditions. As stated in Erickson vs. Hudson, (Wyo.)
249 P. 2d 523 at page 529, "What would be a nuisance in
Belgrave square would not necessarily be so in Bermon d sey. "
Counsel next states on page 2 of brief that this action
could be summed up by pointing to the "attitude" of
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plaintiff towards his neighbors; and that a decision in this
matter could have such far reaching effects to amount to
a public tragedy. Let us therefore look at the facts for a
moment and see who has the "attitude" in this case. Within
an area of one square rod east of plaintiff's lot- between
his fence line and the rear part of defendants' house - is
concentrated three huge Carolina Poplars. And between
the area back or south_ of the house and east of the garage
- the garage is immediately south of the house - is concentrated four additional good-sized trees. (Tr. 95). It
is fair to say that these four trees are concentrated within
an area of two square rods south and east of the one square
rod upon which stands the three poplars. It is submitted
that common knowledge alone dictates that such a concentration of tree growth on such a small area so close to
an adjoining neighbor is unreasonable and a greater burden upon the soil than it can possibly support. The damage resulting to a neighbor must be obvious without the
testimony of an expert .. As an excuse for not wanting the
three poplar trees abated, counsel at page 10 of brief states
that the defendant is physically incapacitated and enjoys
the shade. Assuming the reason given to have some legal
significance, it would seem that whatever the real reason
for not warJing the three poplars abated it could not be
for "shade" reasons alone because there would still exist
very close to the house the four mentioned additional trees.
In fact these trees would duplicate much of the shade
given by the poplars. And it would be difficult to see
-vvhy for the same reason defendants would object to the
removal of the two Siberian Elms. And further bearing
on "attitude" is must be recalled that plaintiff before filing
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suit (but not after) offered to pay the cost of removing
the three poplars and two elms, if permission were given,
and to plant in their place hardwood trees of defendants'
own choosing.
At Tr. 40, plaintiff testified defendant said, when
asked if he would permit removal of the trees, "We decided
I want to keep those trees because they're good for people"
and also "for sentimental reason." "Therefore, we will not
take them down. If they bother you, that's too bad. I
won't remove them." Defendant did not deny making this
statement, so it must be taken as true. I therefore think
defendants' point on "attitude" of plaintiff is very poorly
taken, and that instead of amounting almost to a public
tragedy to grant plaintiff the relief prayed for, I think the
reverse would be true, to fail to grant to plaintiff and to
others, if any there are, who are obliged to suffer the
consequences of such a concentrated tree growth so close
to their property. It is submitted that the trees concentrated in such a small area to the rear of defendants' property is "somewhat of a forest" and affords sufficient shade
to accommodate a large herd of cows.
At the bottom of page 2 and continuing on page 3 of
brief, defendants cite and quote from Carter vs. Chotiner,
(Cal.) 291 P. 577 to the effect that when appellants' acts
create the same type of danger complained of, such acts
may be considered in determining whether respondents'
acts actually constitute a nuisance under all the circumstances. It is submitted that this case cannot help defendants under the circumstances. The question still remains whether the trees on defendants' premises consitute
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a nuisance. The only thing defendants can mention is the
Siberian Elm (not to exceed about six inches in diameter)
which was standing under the shade of three poplars.
Furthermore, in the case of Carter vs. Chotiner there was
at least a conflict in the evidence, whereas in the case at
bar there is no conflict at all regarding the hazard of the
poplars, the overhanging branches, and the damage done
by the roots, etc. In fact the roots of the poplar trees were
identified as being the ones causing the damage.
At page 5 of brief defendants cite and quote from
Kubby vs. Hammond (Ariz.) 198 Pac. 2d. 134, as follows:
"The proper remedy for minor inconveniences arising from
an alleged nuisance lies in action for damages, rather than
injunction." A reading of this case discloses that the question involved was whether or not the operation of an auto
\Vrecking business violates a rezoning ordinance and
whether loud noises interfere with plaintiff's peaceable
enjoyment of his home and cause a depreciation of the
value thereof. At page 140 of the opinion the courts says:
"However a single instance of offensive noise was
shown to have occurred on September 11, 1946, when
a motor was being removed from one of the cars. It
is obvious that as applied to a situation of this kind
such an. incident standing alone is wholly insufficient
to sustain the issuance of an injuction. The maintenance of a nuisance ordinarily implies a continuity or
recurrence of action over a substantial period of time."
It is believed that the quote supplied by counsel is so
inapplicable to the facts in the case at bar as to require
no further comment. Certainly the matters complained
of by plaintiff in the case at bar are not minor.
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Defendants at page 7 of brief cite and point to Erickson vs. Hudson, supra, as a well-reasoned case. The opinion is rather long, but the facts are simple. The court
ordered defendant to reduce the heighth of a "spitefence" erected from a purely malevolent spirit because it
deprived plaintiff of air, light, and view. The court recognized plaintiff's rights by ordering the fence reduced
and the defendant's too by permitting the fence to stand
regardless of the motive he had in erecting, but in permitting the fence to stand the court was particular to see
that no substantial or reasonable rights of the plaintiff
were invaded. Consider the difference in the facts of the
case at bar. No doubt the fence did not have "roots." It
must also- be remembered that the trees on defendants'
property are not "rootless" trees. The damage these roots
cause plaintiff have not been contradicted. Nor is it
denied that trimming the tops of the trees aguments roots
growth and so increases the damages to plain~iff's property.
In fact the trees were trimmed once before and this really
solved nothing. At least part of the tops of the trees carry
dead timber. In the case at bar the lower court simply
recognized the height hazard when it ordered the tops
reduced. It really did not fully or adequately, it is submitted, solve the problem as did the Wyoming court and
it is further ventured that if this case had been before the
Warning court it would have granted to plaintiff the relief
prayed for. We think this case, is a holding in plaintiff's
favor.
Reference is made to pages 18-20 of appellant's brief
where plaintiff cites and discusses Dahl vs. Utah Oil Ref.
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Co. (Utah) 262 P. 269. Defendants also on pages 3-4 of
their brief refer to and quote from this case. The facts are
as different as the night is from day. In the Dahl case,
plaintiff's home was located in an industrial section of Salt
Lake City and about a 1000 feet or more away from plaintiff's business, which the court found was operated in a
modern and well equipped plant and in a careful manner.
It would be difficult to see how the conrt could make any
such finding with refence to the tremendous tree growth
on such a small area on defendant's lot having in mind that
the parties here reside on adjoining lots in a closely builtup residential section of Logan City. The defendants
simply insist they have the right to maintain these large
trees regardless of the consequences to plaintiff. ( Tr. 40).
It is here pointed out that their "attitude" is in error and
based upon a wrong conception of their rights as adjoining
property owners. The facts in the case at bar are clearly
distinguishable from those in the Dahl case and the quote
supplied by defendants must be applied to the facts in
that case. We think the law given in the Dahl case when
r. pplied to the uncontroverted facts existing in the case at
bar justified a holding in favor of plaintiff. But defendants
next say the court found that they would be making a
reasonable use of their property if they trimmed the trees
to reduce the hazard. This appeal is taken because plaintiff believes the lower court misapplied th~ law to the
undisputed facts.

It is further submitted that the mere

fact that the lower court viewed the premises cannot and
does not in the least alter the undisputed facts testified to
by the plaintiff which cannot and were not denied.
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At page 4 of brief defendants say that the authorities
are not in accord in the matter of trees being a nuisance,
and then point out that some states follow what is known
as the "Massachusetts rule" (Smith vs. Holt (Virginia)
128 A. L. R. 1217, and the annotation there given, and
others follow the so-called "California rule" Gostina vs.
Ryland (Wash.) 199 Pac. 298. In this counsel for plaintiff begs to differ with defendants and desire to point out
that in those western states where there exists a statute
such as we have in Utah the decisions are uniform, and
that in states (mostly southern and some eastern) where
no such statute exists the so-called "Massachusetts rule" is
followed. Plaintiff pointed this out in its brief filed herein
at pages 12 to 20 and so to avoid duplication these same
line of cases which defendants refer to at page 5 of their
brief will not here be discussed. However, defendants
state at page 4 of brief that the Supreme Court of California modified the "California rule" and then quotes from
Bonde vs. Bishop, 245 P. 2d. 617. With this statement
plaintiff disagrees and desires to point out that the quote
is inapplicable and misapplied by defendants. By a reference to that case will be observed that damages were
disallowed because they were improperly pleaded. The
'quote supplied applies to situations where the action
brought is not based upon the nuisance statute, and California also has a nuisance statute almost identical to ours.
(See headnote 6). It is also interesting to note that in the
Bonde case only one tree was complained of, whereas in
the instance case complaint is made of three large trees,
. each of which appears to be considerably larger, besides
the two elms, and that while damages were disallowed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

because improperly pleaded, yet the judgment of the court
was permitted to stand. Counsel for defendants next argue
at page 5 that unless the Dahl case is to be overruled this
jurisdiction is committed to the "common sense" doctrine
announced in Smith vs. Holt (Virginia) Supra, and from
which he copiously quotes. The conclusion reached by
counsel, ·it is submitted, does not follow, and inasmuch as
this contention has been previously answered no further
comment will be made, except to say that our Statute cannot be ignored as must be done if the case of Smith vs.
Holt is to be followed.
Defendant recognizes at page 3 of brief that this court
has not passed on the question here presented as it pertains to trees and yet at page 6 states that it would seem
that this court has been· much slower to grant injunctions
than those courts which follow the California rule relating
to trees and then cite Kinsman vs. Utah Gas & Coke Co.
177 P. 418, Ludlow vs. Colorado Animal By-Products C.,
137 P. 2d 347, Thompson vs. Anderson, 153 P. 2d 665,
Coon vs. Utah Construction Co. 228 P. 2d 997 and Shaw
vs. ·Salt Lake City 224 P. 2d 1037. These holdings are in
line with holdings of other states involving similar questions. The writer has read all of these cases and for the
reason that the facts therein are so entirely different no
comment will be made because it seems that none of them
could afford any precedent for the question here pre;.
sented. It seems to the writer that the case of Shaw vs.
Salt Lake City, supra, would have more bearing than any
of the other cases cited because there the court held the
construction and operation of a hot-mix asphalt plant in
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the Cottonwood residential district a nuisance per se and
the same was enjoined prior to commencement of construction. It also held that damages would provide no adequate
compensation even if they could be obtained. It seems to
the writer that the damages resulting to plaintiff are so
aggravated that the trees complained about might also
amount to a nuisance per se.
Defendants also state at page 3 that the State Dept.
of Agriculture provides a list of weeds which have been
determined to be obnoxious, but that their search does not
reveal wherein this state has declared any tree to be noxious. The complete answer to such statement is, we believe
first, that weeds are not an issue in this case; and secondly
that Sec. 78-38-1, U. C. A., 1953, is provided. The meaning of the word "noxious" has been treated at page 13 of
Appellant's brief. The question under the statute is
whether or not the trees in question constitute a nuisance.
Clearly, the finest trees could under certain circumstances
become noxious ones, just as a weed may, under certain
circumstances, be a flower. And at page 8 the question
is posed if plaintiff can compel the removal of these trees,
how far outside his own property may he successfully use
the injunction remedy; that the streets of Salt Lake City
have been littered with branches and limbs (to say nothing
of leaves) after winds (defendants could also have added
littered w~th large trees blown thereupon) and that if
plaintiff's request is granted, it may become an utter impossibility for the small lot owner to maintain trees and
shrubs. That Logan (and it is conceded) is one of the
most beautiful cities in Utah, that its streets are bordered
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with ditches running with fresh clear mountain water and
that in the fall leaves, etc. blow therein. Then asks, "Are
these to be abated." No favorable comment is made in
the evidence concerning the Siberian Elms on Washingtin
St., Ogden. It is believed Ogden City would not again
permit the planting of these trees on its streets because
the danger of blowing over is too great. Certainly it is
not the policy of Logan City to plant them. At any rate,
the question in this case is the problem between two adjoining landowners.
We think the defendants appear to be unduly alarmed.
No such dire results have been reached where similar
nuisance statutes have been enforced in Washington, California, etc. Then too streets are not involved in this action.
In this action the closest Elm asked to be abated is at least
20 feet south of the ditch where runs water and the closest
Poplar is 5 rods south thereof. If this court is to take
judicial knowledge of the streets of Logan, and we suggest
it does, then we desire to point out to this court that for
more than twenty years last past and continuing to this
very day, Logan City has at its own expense removed not
only hundreds but many, many thousands of elms, poplars
and other similar huge trees not only on the parking but
on the property of property-owners growing close to the
sidewalk,all of which were trees planted in a by-gone day.
As a result Logan City now has many miles of its streets
lined with beautiful hardwood trees, namely maple and
white ash and linden. Never heard of a problem resulting
from leaves from these trees cluttering up the ditches and
culverts. As elsewhere the citizens of Logan solve this
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problem. It is difficult to see where any pronouncement
resulting from a favorable decision to plaintiff in this case
will adversely affect any small lot owner in the reasonable
use of his property in the growing of trees, shrubs, etc.
We believe counsel's fears are unwarranted.
In conclusion it is submitted that defendants have not
in their brief given any reasons either upon the facts or
upon the law applicable to the undisputed facts which
warrant in law upholding the decision of the lower court
and that the same should be reversed giving to plaintiff
the relief prayed for, together with his costs expended
herein.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE C. HEINRICH,
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
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